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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's judgment based
on a determination that Petitioner and Cross-Respondent had no constructive
notice of the allegedly dangerous condition at issue in this case.

II.

Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's judgment based
on a determination that there was no permanent dangerous condition.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at 2007 UT App 249, 166

P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court granted petitioners' and cross-petitioner's petitions for
writ of certiorari on December 10, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court
of Appeals' decision by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
There are no controlling provisions of statutes or rules in this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT NEITHER
HICKORY KIST'S OWNER JAMES FILLMORE NOR HIS EMPLOYEES
HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE PUDDLE OF WATER ON
WHICH DONNA JEX SLIPPED AND FELL.
Although much of the argument in Donna Jex's Brief of Appellee and Cross-

Appellant is spent saying that there is insufficient guidance under Utah case law as to
what constitutes constructive notice, Utah case law is clear that constructive notice is
imputed when "the condition had existed long enough that [the storeowner] should have
discovered it." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (citing
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)).
The Utah Supreme Court elaborated on the type of circumstances in which a
storeowner could be found to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition in Ohlson
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Utah 1977). In Ohlson, the plaintiff
slipped and fell on some dry spaghetti on a grocery store floor. Id. at 754. The testimony
at trial was that "the spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into small pieces, and that it
extended from aisle ten around the end of that aisle into the main aisle for five or six feet
toward the cash register at the front of the store." Id Other notable facts were that the
only inspection of the area was "a casual glance down the aisle" forty-five minutes before
the accident, even though the store manager knew it was during the busiest time for the
store, and the aisle in which the spaghetti was strewn was visible from the cash register.
See id. at 755. The Ohlson court affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
-2-

reasoning as follows: "Considering the area over which the spaghetti was strewn and the
dirty and broken condition it was in, coupled with other evidence recited above, the jury
could reasonably find as it did." Id Thus, the Utah Supreme Court was willing to find
constructive notice where the evidence supported that a hazardous condition existed long
enough that the storeowner should have known of its existence.
In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court is unwilling to find constructive notice where
it is grounded on speculation. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 365, 284
P.2d 477, 478 (1955) ("a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the defendant was
negligent"). The Utah Supreme Court described the facts in Lindsay as follows:
Plaintiff, after dining in defendant's coffee shop, slipped in a
small quantity of water which somehow got on the floor some
time after she was seated. Although the evidence indicated
that a waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff and her
companion, there is no evidence as to whether the waitress,
the plaintiff, her companion, other patrons or persons spilled
the water on the floor, or exactly when it was spilled, or
whether the management knew of its existence. In other
words, there was no evidence as to how the water got onto the
floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there
or that the defendant had knowledge of its presence.
Id. at 365, 284 P.2d at 478. Given those facts, the court affirmed judgment against the
plaintiff. See id.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, Utah case law on constructive notice in premises
liability matters is clear and well-developed. In the present matter, the Utah Court of
Appeals applied the foregoing principles, holding that:
In this case, there is no direct evidence suggesting that the
-3-

puddle of water had been there for any significant period of
time. Further, there was nothing about the puddle itself
suggesting that it had been there for a long time. Nor is there
any reasonable inference that the store owner should have
been aware of a four-inch puddle of water on the hardwood
floor. Therefore, we conclude that conjecture and speculation
is the only way to determine the length of time the puddle was
on the floor, and thus, it would be improper to impute
constructive notice to Defendants.
Jexv. JRA, Inc.. 2007 UT App. 249 at f 16, 166 P.3d at 659. Accordingly, Donna Jex's
Cross Appeal should be denied.
Ms. Jex's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant argues that the puddle of water in
which Ms. Jex slipped and fell could have existed for an hour or more and could have
been created by melted snow tracked in from the shoes of James Fillmore or Sharlene
Barber. See Appellee Brief at 13-15. However, it also could have been tracked in by Ms.
Jex, herself, only moments before she slipped in it. Alternatively, it could have been
tracked in by the Pepsi delivery man who entered the store sometime after the floor mats
were placed but before Ms. Jex entered the store (R. at 289). Or, it may have come from
some other source that has not yet been considered. In fact, no one saw the puddle of
water before Ms. Jex stepped in it. (R. at 284 and 289). No one knows where it came
from or how long it had been there. As the Court of Appeals noted, "there was nothing
about the puddle itself suggesting that it had been there for a long time." Jex, 2007 UT
App. 249 at If 16, 166 P.3d at 659. The fact that Mr. Fillmore and Ms. Barber wore shoes
with deeper tread does not establish, more likely than not, that the puddle came from their
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shoes. Of necessity, Ms. Jex's theory of how the puddle was created is laden with
conjecture and speculation. Utah law is clear that "a jury cannot be permitted to speculate
that the defendant was negligent." Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d at 365, 284
P.2d at 478. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' ruling that neither Hickory Kist's owner,
James Fillmore, nor his employees had constructive notice of the puddle of water in
which Ms. Jex slipped and fell should be affirmed.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT DONNA JEX
COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE PERMANENT CONDITION
THEORY OF LIABILITY,
Ms. Jex's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant suggests that by having a

hardwood floor in the store, the defendants employed a method of operation that was
inherently dangerous. See Appellee Brief at 17-18. In Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841
P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals explained that "where the
storeowner chooses a method of operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the
expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, an injured party need
not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of the specific condition." Id at 1226,
citing De Weese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.2d 898, 901 (1956). In
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d at 477, however, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "inherent danger and foreseeability [are] essential elements of the [method of
operation] claim."
In Schnuphase, the Utah Supreme Court explained Canfield, finding that
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"Albertsons created a temporary condition by placing empty boxes around a 'farmer's
pack' display of lettuce . . . . " See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Canfield, 841
P.2d at 1225). The Schnuphase court further found that "Albertsons had notice of the
potentially hazardous condition, as evidenced by the store's placement of empty boxes
and its instituting a regular schedule for inspecting and cleaning the produce section." Id.
(citing Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1227). Thus, the Schnuphase court found that the
foreseeability element was satisfied because the Albertsons defendant in Canfield created
the hazardous condition and further had notice of the condition evidenced by its
inspection and cleaning procedures.
Similarly, in De Weese, the defendant J.C. Penny created a potentially hazardous
condition by implementing a policy of having a terrazzo surface in the entryway of the
store, without any mats or applying any abrasives to the surface. When it rained or
snowed, the store would lay down mats and apply abrasives to the terrazzo surfacing to
prevent slipping. See De Weese, 5 Utah 2d at 120, 297 P.2d at 900. When J.C. Penney
neglected to put down the mats or abrasives during a snow storm and the plaintiff slipped
and fell, J.C. Penney was held liable for the plaintiffs injuries. See id. Crucial to the
court's ruling was the fact that "it could have been 25 to 30 minutes after the storm began
that the accident occurred, during which time it was, of course, observable by the
defendant's employees out of the windows." Id. at 122, 297 P.2d at 902. The court
reasoned:
Upon the basis of such evidence we conclude that reasonable
-6-

minds could find that sufficient precipitation had fallen and
that enough time had elapsed so that in the exercise of
ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of its customers,
the defendant should have employed the corrective measures.
Id. Because J.C. Penney had a policy of putting down mats when the terrazzo surface
became slippery but then failed to do so after it had notice of the snowstorm, it could be
found liable for the plaintiffs resulting injuries.
In contrast, in the present matter, Hickory Kist did not utilize a method of
operation that created an unreasonably dangerous condition. Unlike the storeowner in De
Weese, Hickory Kist did not have a policy of putting down mats only when it rained or
snowed. Rather, Sharlene Barber put down mats every morning before the store opened,
including on the morning of the subject accident (R. at 290). Moreover, unlike the
storeowner in Canfield, there is no evidence to suggest that Hickory Kist had prior notice
of the potential for hazards to exist where Ms. Jex fell. On the basis of those facts, the
Court of Appeals found that there was a "lack of direct evidence indicating that
Defendants chose a method of operation that was inherently dangerous and foreseeable."
Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at If 23, 166 P.3d at 660. The court therefore concluded that
"Defendants were not negligent." Id The Utah Court of Appeals followed clear and
established case law regarding recovery under the permanent condition theory of liability,
and its ruling should be upheld.
III.

DONNA JEX IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
Donna Jex's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant argues that the Utah Court of
-7-

Appeals erred when it found that Hickory Kist did not create an unreasonably dangerous
condition. Slee Appellee Brief at 19-20. The ground for that argument is that Ms. Jex
submitted an affidavit from expert witness Charles Haines regarding the standard of care
owed by the Hickory Kist defendants and that they did not submit an affidavit from a
countering expert. However, such an argument presupposes that the Hickory Kist
defendants had notice of the puddle of water on the store floor, which the Utah Court of
Appeals expressly rejected. See Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at % 23, 166 P.3d 660. As the
Utah Supreme Court has held,
fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability
results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he
had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual
knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it;
and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that
in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478.
Even under the method of operation line of cases, Donna Jex has not made a prima
facie case of negligence against the Hickory Kist defendants. In Schnuphase, the plaintiff
claimed, among other things, that the defendant failed to take the following precautionary
measures: "installation of nonskid mats or any other traction-enhancing coverings,
placement of warning signs indicating the possibility of encountering spilled ice cream,
appointment of a spill monitor in the deli section, or installation of a lower counter to
facilitate employee monitoring of the area." Id. at 479. Nevertheless, the court found, as
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a matter of law, that such method of operation did not create an inherently dangerous
condition. See id.
In the present matter, the affidavit of Charles Haines opines that the Hickory Kist
defendants failed to have better lighting; inspect the floors more frequently; place more
mats on the floor; place signs stating "slippery when wet;" and have written checklists
and formal training for caring for floors on snowy days. Such alleged shortcomings are
similar to those alleged by the plaintiff in Schnuphase. Just as in Schnuphase, Donna Jex
in the present matter has failed to provide evidence that such shortcomings created an
inherently dangerous condition.
The mere fact that Ms. Jex has presented claimed shortcomings through expert
affidavit does not establish a standard of care in this matter. The Utah Court of Appeals
discussed that issue in Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). The court explained:
It is true that expert testimony may be helpful in elucidating
the applicable standard of care in certain cases, and even
necessary in others.... Such testimony is needed "where the
average person has little understanding of the duties owed by
particular trades or professions," as in cases involving
medical doctors, architects, and engineers.
Id. at 574 (internal citations omitted). However, "[w]here the propriety of the defendant's
action 'is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman . . . the guidance
provided by expert testimony is unnecessary.'" Id, quoting Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d
348, 352 (Utah 1980). The duties a business owner owes to invitees are not beyond an
-9-

ordinary person's understanding. Accordingly, expert testimony is not required to counter
the expert affidavit of Charles Haines.
Jex's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant cites Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2
(January 15, 2008), ^| 7, for the proposition that if the moving party shows there is no
material disputed fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Appellee Brief at 19. The Orivs case,
however, actually holds just the opposite: "Where the moving party would bear the
burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of his claim in order to
show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ^[10. In the
present matter, Ms. Jex had the burden of proving that the Hickory Kist defendants were
negligent. The affidavit of Charles Haines failed to establish that claim as a matter of
law. Because Donna Jex failed to make a prima facie case of negligence against the
Hickory Kist defendants, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in denying Donna Jex's
appeal on that issue.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court should affirm the Utah
Court of Appeals on all issues raised in Donna Jex's Cross-Appeal.
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